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WHAT IS SAID AND DONE1 
Two years before her death in 2009, environmentalist, feminist, and town planner, Sue Hendler, 
presented me with me a pile of Trumpeter journals she had kept, preserved in her university 
office. They ran from the very first issue, just a single double-sided piece of photostatted paper, 
through to the end of volume four in the fall of 1987, published just as I began my own PhD in 
environmental philosophy. Alan Drengson’s (1983, 1) opening suggestion that the time was ripe 
to initiate a Canadian “econetwork” seems borne out by the fact that this newsletter has since 
become the premier journal for deep ecology/ecosophy. Fittingly, it opened with a very brief 
discussion of a few “basic concepts” that might serve to differentiate deep ecology from shallow 
anthropocentric environmentalism and from scientific ecology:  
Ecology in the narrow sense refers to the biological science of ecology. However, 
ecological paradigms and principles are being developed and applied in almost all 
disciplines, and these paradigms have to do with the way we approach 
understanding the relationships and inter-connections within and between living 
beings which give to each its special place and identity. Human ecology, e.g., 
must certainly take account of the role of our subjective lives and spiritual needs, 
as well as our biological ones, in terms of their ecological effects. Ecology in this 
sense is not a reductionist undertaking, but a movement toward a more whole 
(or holistic) vision and understanding of world processes. Deep ecology seeks to 
look into all levels of existence (ibid., 2, emphasis in original)  
The subsequent influence of deep ecology can be gauged by its frequent association with 
environmental activism but also by the extent to which it became a target of ill-considered and 
often ill-tempered critiques from all shades of the traditional political spectrum.  
Deep ecology, it has been said, is mystical, misanthropic, politically misguided, utopian, 
irrational, and impractical. Its subjectivism and holism constitute “mindless dogmas” born from 
the “intellectual poverty” of its “father”, Arne Naess  (Bookchin 1993, 47). Despite pointing to its 
naïve naturalism many, somewhat ironically, also consider deep ecology insufficiently 
materialistic, even a contemporary form of “idealism” (the ultimate Marxist putdown). Its 
explicit intellectual diversity is reinterpreted as the lack of a coherent theoretical paradigm 
                                                     
1 Although the title plays on/with Lenin’s What is to be Done? (1989 [1902]), it does so critically. I have no intention 
of offering a political program concerning deep ecology’s future.  
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and/or political program with any revolutionary potential (see, for example Martin 2011, 112). 
In Timothy Luke’s (1997, 24) terms, deep ecology “fail[s] to ask or answer Lenin’s question of 
advanced industrialism” (presumably the question of his most famous work “What is to be 
done?”) and therefore “lacks a theory of the transition” (26).2    
The diversity of deep ecology’s intellectual sources, which Luke (2002, 183) refers to as an 
“ecological omelette,” purportedly leaves deep ecologists lost in a “theoretical fog”, such that, 
as van Wyck (1997, 40) argues, Devall and Sessions’ key text Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First 
Century contains a “litany of quotes and excerpts spanning Lao Tsu to Gregory Bateson [...that] 
reads rather like a New-Age Bartlett’s Quotations.” Strangely, this ideological eclecticism also, 
apparently, lends itself to promoting an unthinking totalitarianism via a “völkisch” and 
reactionary modernism such as that which “preceded the rise of National Socialism” (73). Such 
views find their apogee in the (il)liberal diatribes of Luc Ferry who regards those influenced by 
deep ecology as part Nietzschean vitalists, part communist fellow travellers, witless stooges in 
the revival of the core values of “Nazi ecologism” [sic]; they are antidemocratic, technology 
fearing, pacifistic, anti-enlightenment misanthropes “propelled … by a hatred of humanism and 
Western civilization.” (Ferry 1992, 78 and passim). 
It is not my intention to tackle these claims here (although anyone interested should certainly 
read Cary Wolfe’s (1998) critique of Ferry). My point is merely that deep ecology, it seems, is 
taken to exemplify everything wrong with environmentalism. That authors as politically 
divergent as, for example, Ferry and Bookchin should have found agreement in their analyses of 
deep ecology is both striking and almost as bizarre as the fact that they regarded their own 
polemical excesses as epitomizing rational and enlightened discourse. Something else is 
obviously going on here. Part of the issue may just be that, insofar as it is a recognizably 
different approach, deep ecology has indeed provided a relatively popular, and sometimes 
inspirational, frame for thinking about contemporary environmental relations. For many 
environmentalists it has offered a radical alternative that competes with, and resists attempts 
to squeeze its insights into, more traditional theoretical, political, and economic straightjackets, 
whether (neo)liberal, Marxist, or – to Bookchin’s chagrin – even coeval ecological variants like 
his social ecology.3 And insofar as it is a competitor for the hearts and minds of those segments 
                                                     
2
 Luke is actually much more positive about many aspects of deep ecology in his later work. For example, 
reassessing Devall and Sessions’ Living as if Nature Mattered, he recognizes its wide-ranging and broadly positive 
political influence: “Living as if nature mattered is a vitally important goal, and the guidance that Deep Ecology 
gives on this account could be followed, on an individual and collective level, to make changes that are not 
insignificant.” (Luke 2002, 184-5). 
3
 Bookchin actually contributed a chapter to Michael Tobias’ early collection, Deep Ecology, a year after The 
Trumpeter began.  
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of the populace concerned with environmental issues it becomes embroiled in a series of 
staged confrontations with these perspectives.   
To some degree this is inevitable, but the problem is that those critiquing deep ecology are, of 
course, staging these confrontations according to the own predetermined interests and logics. 
This can make deep ecology an easy target precisely because, while Drengson is right that deep 
ecology does not have to be “reductive,” it does typically have a gaping hole in its analyses. 
That is to say, many of those who explicitly view their work as falling under the heading “deep 
ecology” have been relatively unconcerned with, and sometimes quite disparaging of, many 
forms of socio-political, cultural and even political theory (Sessions 1995 & 2006).4 Sale (1999, 
217) approvingly notes that “it is probably accurate to say that deep ecologists think primarily 
in biotic rather than social terms” and he considers that from “this larger perspective, it does 
not really matter what the petty social and political arrangements are that have led to our 
ecological crisis” (217, my emphasis).   
Sale, I think, is profoundly mistaken, although his views may explain why many deep ecologists 
write as if social, cultural and political theories and philosophies (hereafter abbreviated to 
“social theory”) did not, or might as well not exist, and as if deep ecological politics was just a 
matter of psychological / spiritual enlightenment, bioregionalism, and/or science driven policy. 
They often assume that the relations that should concern us are only those that operate 
directly between the consciousness of the ecologically entangled human individual and 
something un-problematically called nature, which is also the locus of their concerns. There are, 
of course, exceptions to this, but even these more socially aware approaches have to note this 
lacuna (McLaughlin 1993, 211). The social, we might say, is left as something of a black box and 
to this extent the proclamations of some deep ecologists do indeed appear socio-politically 
reductive and naively naturalistic. For example, deep ecologists have frequently underplayed 
the effects of social relations on their own ideas, as past debates about the “social 
construction” of nature show (Smith 1999).5   
One recurrent worry of many deep ecologists seems to be that any serious recognition of the 
effects of society on our self-understandings and our environmental relations, and especially on 
                                                     
4 Interestingly, while Naess (1997) was not entirely negative in his assessment of cultural theorists such as Derrida, 
he is at best equivocal. They might prove of a source of “inspiration” (4) but, like “most philosophically concerned 
supporters” of deep ecology he does not expect they “can be of much help” (Naess 1997, 6). 
5 This article drew a rather bizarre response from Arne Naess (2000, and see my reply in Smith 2001).  Naess could 
not, it seems, distinguish between my setting out the diverse positions held by social theorists on the social 
construction of nature and my own quite different views. This lack of communication is symptomatic of the 
difficulty in trying to take both deep ecology and social theory seriously.   
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our ethical and aesthetic values, leads us down the slippery slope of cultural relativism. This 
might, in turn, be thought to undermine the possibility of deep ecology speaking of and/or for 
“nature” per se, rather than just offering other, culturally mediated, understandings of the 
world.  
For example, in volume 4, issue 4 of The Trumpeter, Warwick Fox’s critique of Henryk 
Skolimoswski hinges on   
the essential point ... that he has not overcome the basic problem of relativism 
that besets all subjectivist and non-cognitivist positions. If my values are simply a 
function of my culture or of my species then what claim do they have to be 
better than those of any [other] culture or species. (Fox 1987, 33)   
But, of course, values are never “simply a function” of one’s culture. They are not, by any 
stretch of the imagination, simple, they are not just functionally pre-determined by one’s 
culture, and they are not developed in relation to culture alone; my encounters with “nature”, 
my self-reflections, my brain chemistry, the weather, my knowledge of ecology, etc., can all 
have profound effects on my values and actions, and, what is more, all of these things also 
interact in complex ways with each other. That said, even our most reflexive values are, to 
some extent, (and perhaps even to a large degree) affected, enabled, and (de)limited by our 
economic, social, historical, and cultural circumstances, and I think we really do have to admit 
that any one set of values cannot be claimed better than any other without recourse to at least 
some socially particular presuppositions. And values do vary and change, both culturally and 
temporally, as every study of environmental sociology or history shows, and even the kinds of 
arguments that might convince others that certain values, including those of deep ecology, are 
“better” also change (not least because “better” is itself a relative term).  
The fear of socio-cultural “relativism” and the spectre of social theory in general has, I think, 
been theoretically and ethically/politically debilitating for deep ecology. Recognizing the 
important and often inextricable effects of social as well as natural history on our 
understandings of self and nature is actually a vital aspect of our ability to respond to constantly 
changing circumstances.6   
                                                     
6
 As if to prove my point, one reviewer of the paper did indeed see the claims made here as indicative of a slippery 
slope towards cultural relativism and “strong social constructivism”. Their comments focused on three things. First, 
that I was simply stating, without providing evidence that culture influences ethical values. Second, that despite my 
explicit comments here to the contrary, this must mean that I think that “in the end” such values are grounded in 
or determined by culture alone. Third, that any such values can have no normative force because they are not 
universal or objective. Let me take these in turn.  
First, the claim that social, cultural, historical circumstances inform our values, including our ethical values, should 
not really be controversial – it is attested in very great detail by a huge volume of historical, anthropological, socio-
cultural, philosophical etc. data, not to mention our own life experiences. Take, for example, the very well-
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WHAT CAN SOCIAL THEORY DO (FOR DEEP ECOLOGY)?  
Imagine a society in which people had no theoretical understanding of their own situation in 
relation to each other, to their architecture and technology, to their political and economic 
institutions, to processes of social stagnation or change that affect them, to the relations 
between self, values, ethics and society and between these and nature, to the language they 
use to communicate, the media of communication used – whether written, spoken, 
electronically transmitted, the relations between society and health, to the role or status of 
different kinds of knowledge and of knowledge production, of history, aesthetics, ideology, 
power, gender, and so on. Such a scenario seems more like an ant colony than a society, 
although there are, indubitably, societies where there is only supposed to be one way to 
understand all of these things, whether in accordance with fate, tradition, the will of some 
                                                                                                                                                                            
documented influence of Romanticism as a social, literary, artistic, and scientific, movement on modern Western 
evaluations of natural landscapes (see, for example, Evernden 1993; Bate 1991). Wordsworth’s views of nature are 
obviously very different from those of most contemporary venture capitalists and from members of any Amazonian 
rainforest culture, then or now. I’m not sure on what grounds one could possibly ignore such influences and 
variations or think them somehow incidental but it would presumably have to depend on the person concerned 
making claims that they have some privileged access to the truth of the matter where nature is understood, that 
only their views are “rational” etc. This seems, a priori, unlikely. 
Second, the claim that the “social” informs our understandings and values does not mean that these 
understandings and values are, in the end, determined by culture – it means just what it says it means - that these 
values are, often inextricably, informed by these social aspects of our worldly existence – along with many others. 
Social theorists are not all cultural determinists, they do not all reduce nature in the sense of the more-than-just-
human world to just an artifact of culture. Of course some forms of “strong” social constructivism have come 
perilously close to stating this but this is neither a necessary concomitant of taking social theory seriously nor, as I 
explain in great detail elsewhere, is it my position (Smith 1999). What it does mean is that there is no philosophical 
“view from nowhere.” All views are informed (but again not necessarily determined) by our historical and natural 
historical emplacement, they are all expressed from somewhere. This seems an eminently ecological as well as a 
sociological position to me, our varying socio-natural positions, our “environmental” contexts, really do matter in 
terms of value formation.  
Third, the fact that our values are differently informed by our “cultural” as well as our “natural” situations does not 
mean that such values have no ethical or normative force. This view rests on a kind of all or nothing position where 
either values are “objective” and universal or they are just subjective and hence just matters of personal taste. But, 
notice that this division between objective and subjective is a particularly modern Western perspective, one often 
associated by environmentalists in its extreme (Cartesian) forms as partly to blame for our current environmental 
problems. Also note that social theory, even in most of its traditional humanist forms, attempts to emphasize the 
constitutive effects of social relations upon our subjectivity, it is all about understanding inter-subjectivity including 
the formation of behavioral and evaluative norms and their cultural force. Here too there is a link to ecological 
theories that also focus on relations and contexts, not just individual beings qua individuals. Some Kantians (and 
various religions) may think that ethical values have to have some form of “universal” assent to have any normative 
force but, I’m not a Kantian and I don’t think this. In any case we might ask how many, if any, of our ethical values 
relating to nature are objective and universal and actually have such normative force. Is it wrong to kill sentient 
creatures for food? Some animal rights theorists might think so, and may lay down a universal law to such ends, but 
actually this does not tend to be the case with deep ecologists.  
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almighty leader, a party line, biology, an institutional religion, the dictates of an “invisible 
hand,” and so on.   
Such a society, lacking the possibility for these dimensions of social reflexivity, are not likely to 
be well equipped to understand, let alone alter, situations where that society is placed at 
serious risk due to changing circumstances. This is especially so if those changing circumstances 
are actually initiated and promoted by certain aspects of that society’s own socio-cultural and 
economic structure, that is, where there are contradictions between its (lack of or extremely 
limited) self-understanding and reality it faces. The requirement for critical reflexivity becomes 
even more apparent in a situation where this reality, let’s call it “nature,” rather than just being 
an external environment with its own entirely separate dynamics, is itself caught up in, and 
sometimes radically transformed by, its relations with that society – that is where we might be 
speaking, in many, if not all, cases, of nature(s)-culture(s) – a rice paddy, an agricultural field, a 
city park, a weather system affected by global warming – rather than nature and culture as two 
entirely separate realms. Here, it is in many cases impossible to disentangle the natural from 
the cultural.  But if the problem is, even in part, a lack of social reflexivity then critics need to do 
more than just point this out; they need to try to provide ways to think about and address these 
contradictions.   
To recognize that ecology needs to be socio-theoretically informed does not mean that we have 
submit to the kind of “anything goes equivalence” stressed by critics of cultural relativism, or to 
ignore the natural sciences or our “ecological selves.” Recognizing the reality of social relations 
does not mean that we are driven to deny every society’s dependence upon a more-than-social 
world that predates it and will also antedate it (albeit in forms that have often been 
irremediably altered through these encounters). It means giving due consideration to the social 
mediations of our understandings and activities with(in) the more-than-just-human world. 
Indeed, if we think about it, another term for this broader kind of relativism, if we start thinking 
against the tendency to separate social from natural conditions, might actually be “ecology.”   
This might seem a strange claim but to return to Drengson’s opening remarks, “ecological 
paradigms” involve understanding “the relationships and inter-connections within and between 
living beings which give to each its special place and identity” (1983, 2). If this applies to the 
ecological relations within which each beings’ existence and identity is composed then it seems 
entirely reasonable to assume that this applies to beings’ values as well. Indeed, many deep 
ecologists would want to emphasize this where nature is concerned. And if we admit that social 
relations have effects then there is, after all, a “social ecology,” (and not just in Bookchin’s 
sense) that is, a socio-cultural “level [sic] of existence” (2), which deep ecology needs to 
address. So, insofar as deep ecology wants to provide plausible (and in this sense a ‘better’) 
analyses of how nature is currently (mis)understood, then it makes sense to engage with those 
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“disciplines” and perspectives that make understanding society and culture their focus. It can 
only avoid seeming (and/or being) reductive to the extent that social and cultural theories are 
taken seriously for the ecological possibilities they might offer. That deep ecology has so far 
(and here again I am generalizing) failed to do this, or has even focused on those socio-
biological7 theories that are most reductive and least ecological in this broader – not just 
biological – sense, is the main reason why many socio-theoretically oriented ecologists, myself 
included, are reticent to call themselves deep ecologists.  
So if societies are not, actually, like ant colonies, if they are not just biotic, and where there are 
frameworks, possibilities, and entire fields of research for thinking about social relations and 
dynamics, surely it makes sense to engage with them. The task of critical social and cultural 
theories is to provide such understandings.8 If the social analysis of deep ecology is to be 
anything more than a repository for reductive sociobiological speculation and philosophical 
naturalism then it needs to address this social-theoretical void, and address it in a creative 
manner.9 
WHAT NEEDS TO BE SAID?  
There are, of course, some serious difficulties in attempting to combine deep ecology’s critiques 
with most social, cultural and political theory. The focus on meaningful relations with and 
between more than just human-beings distinguishes deep ecology from more dominant 
political approaches and from diverse theoretical paradigms within disciplines such as sociology 
– whether Marxist, rational choice, Weberian, hermeneutic, structural-functionalist, feminist, 
systems theoretical, symbolic interactionist, ethnomethodological postmodern, and so on. The 
social sciences have only recently begun to take ecology seriously, and even then usually only as 
                                                     
7 For an account of some of the problems with the E. O. Wilson’s sociobiological research program in relation to 
hermeneutic understandings of social and natural history see Smith (2014).  
8
 To be against sociobiological reductionism is not reject the idea that “biology has a significant role to play in 
understanding human behaviour” (Sessions 2006, 127). It is to reject the idea that biology has such a significant role 
to play that one can effectively excise or ignore the socio-historical, economic, cultural etc. aspects of our activities 
and understandings, including our ecological activities and understandings, in favour of an analysis of a 
metaphysical abstraction referred to as our “human nature” (ibid). 
9
I do not want this to be misunderstood. While I can see nothing but the bleakest possible future for sociobiological 
reductionism, or any society and ecology that might end up being informed by it (Smith 2014), there is certainly 
plenty of room for the philosophical, poetic, and spiritual (in the broadest sense) approaches found in deep 
ecology. These often offer profound insights into our individual relations with nature, and there is no denying its 
effectiveness in expressing and inspiring various forms of ecological activism. Even if deep ecology does no more 
than provide an intellectual environment where such approaches might prosper and thereby keep alive the idea of 
nature’s non-instrumental worth, it will remain a vital strand of ecology. But these approaches are not enough by 
themselves.  
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the “external environment” or “system” within which and upon which societies operate, rather 
than as a mode of more-than-just biological inter-relatedness, still less as a mode of 
constituting more-than-just-human ethical and political values and communities (but see 
below).   
Deep ecology on the other hand is often framed in terms of the idea of a much broader 
“sociality”; it recognizes diverse communities of life on Earth that are composed not only 
through biotic factors but also, where applicable, through ethical relations, that is, the valuing 
of other beings as more than just resources. Put simply, deep ecology would obviously not be 
deep ecology without environmental ethics, without heartfelt expressions of concern for the 
wellbeing of at least some more-than-just-human others. This ethical resistance to a core 
assumption shared by all traditional political ideologies – that only humans can be considered 
ends in themselves – is also what inspires and informs much environmental activism. Deep 
ecology, in all its diversity, and like other forms of radical environmentalism, finds ways of 
trying to speak about values and meanings that anthropocentric, or perhaps, at the risk of 
misunderstanding, we might just say, “humanist,” paradigms consider valueless and/or 
meaningless.10  
This makes it impossible for deep ecologists to simply adopt or deploy the theoretical 
frameworks and ideological presuppositions of mainstream social-theory and / or traditional 
politics. No one should expect that. And, where humanism is so ideologically ingrained and so 
explicitly promoted, as the ultimate political principle, then to even question its role is, almost 
automatically, to be labeled misanthropic. But, as radical ecologists often find themselves 
arguing, to take a position against the unquestioned assumption of human sovereignty is not to 
disparage or denigrate human beings; it is to take sides in an argument about the ethical 
importance of more than just humans (Livingstone 1988, 116; Drengson 1995, 5; Smith 2011, 
passim). Radical ecology counters a restrictive humanism that is pervasive, and not just in 
dominant (neo)liberal approaches but also, for example, in Western Marxist thought, which, for 
all its critical insights, has remained resolutely humanist with regard to nature being only a 
                                                     
10
 There are, of course, valuable ethical, political, and epistemic aspects of humanist thought in its more general 
historical sense, especially insofar as it has contributed to the broadening of ethical concerns, the emergence of 
various sciences, and the development of a culture of skeptical and reflexive criticism that Gianni Vattimo refers to 
as “weak thought,” that is, thought that critiques claims to absolute and/or divine “forms of authority” (2004, 32), 
whether epistemic and/or political. Humanism may even have contributed to certain forms of environmental 
concern as Hinchman (2004) for example, argues. However, humanism as an ideology has also implicitly and 
explicitly depended upon and promulgated its own divisive metaphysics, one that excepts humans as such from the 
rest of the world through various metaphysical iterations of the “anthropological machine”(Agamben 2004;  see 
also Smith 2011 for an ecological take on this).  
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resource for human use.11 This partly explains why deep ecologists have tended to avoid 
framing their discussions of an environmental crisis in Marxian terms at all. But, if we take this 
as just one example, any analysis of environmental issues without some analysis of its dominant 
socioeconomic form, that is, capitalism is obviously going to appear socio-politically reductive.12 
And if Marx gets short shrift it is hardly surprising that other social and cultural theorists get 
even less attention.   
Yet deep ecology, as a field, might find engagement with at least some of the various and ever 
changing forms of social and cultural theory both inspiring and useful, and this despite the 
serious ecological problems these theories might have when taken as a whole and/or in their 
usual academic habitats, and even their explicit antipathy of some of their proponents towards 
deep ecology. I do not want to underestimate the difficulties here. I am heartily sick of reading 
and reviewing dismissive (and sometimes just ignorant) accounts of radical and deep ecology 
from mainstream socio-theoretical and political perspectives. But, as already outlined, my worry 
has also been that many of these accounts do indeed pick on a deep ecology that is not entirely 
a straw person precisely because of this social void. And contra certain views expressed by some 
deep ecologists, authors as diverse as Irigaray, Derrida, Said, Foucault, Agamben, Butler, 
Rancière, Gadamer, Adorno, hooks, Virilio, Latour, Deleuze, Kristeva, Grosz, Lacan, Benjamin, 
Arendt, Lefebvre, etc. etc. etc. do have important and interesting things to say that are of direct 
relevance to ecology, especially if we take ecology in the wider sense of more-than-just human 
community, just outlined. Some of them, like Virilio, even use the term ecology as a key concept 
in their works albeit with particular inflections that may not seem immediately applicable to 
deep ecology.   
I think it is fair to say that few who write positively about such theories from an environmental 
perspective count themselves as deep ecologists. Such thinkers may be sympathetic to some, 
                                                     
11
 Look, for example, at the vast majority of papers discussing ecology published in journals like New Left Review or 
Radical Philosophy. Interestingly Radical Philosophy used to provide a venue for the formalistic, and sometimes 
terminologically opaque, variety of “anti-humanism” that briefly gained some ground through the structuralist 
writings of Louis Althusser in the 1970’s and 80’s but then this certainly never challenged the idea of human 
sovereignty and nature as a resource. The days when it would publish the work of Richard and Val Routley seem 
long gone. For my own views of some of the ecological problems with Marxist theory see Smith (2001), chapter 3.   
12
 Back when The Trumpeter began deep ecologists might have pointed to the Soviet Union and China as examples 
where very different economic systems, ones explicitly founded on Marxist principles, certainly had no better 
environmental records (see, for example, McLaughlin 1993, Shapiro 2001). Ecological problems are obviously not 
just reducible to capitalism. But now that capitalism is global there seems very little excuse for not taking at least 
some aspects of Marx’s analysis of it, such as commodity fetishism, seriously. In any case, the fact that different 
forms of society seem to create environmental problems requires more detailed attention to be paid to the social 
level, not less. According to The Trumpeter’s online search engine there have been 57 articles that mention the 
term “capitalism” since the journals’ inception but a quick look through these leaves one feeling that most of these, 
with a few obvious exceptions like the work of the late David Orton (2000), are really little more than passing 
mentions.  
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perhaps all, aspects of Naess’s famous eight point platform, but they have no interest in signing 
up to it as anything like a deep ecology manifesto. They may even regard the obsession with 
this platform amongst some deep ecologists as counter-productive, because its defense, in one 
or other of its versions, has become something of a rallying point against “unwelcome” socio-
theoretically informed critiques of deep ecology.    
For example, George Sessions, in the course of a very wide ranging critique of social theoretical 
approaches, berates ecofeminist Karren Warren for daring to suggest that there may be 
differences between certain deep ecologists in North America and the “founding father” of the 
“movement,” Arne Naess. She had not, it seems, understood that all of the “five major 
American theorists” of deep ecology all “accepted the 1984 Eight Point platform, together with 
the Apron Diagram which separates ‘ultimate premises’ (such as Self-Realization) from the Eight 
Point platform” (Sessions 2006, 153). But even saying this risks making deep ecology sound like 
Scientology or some tiny Marxist-Leninist sect from the 1970’s where people’s capacity to be 
identified as sect/party members counts on their acceptance of a particular doctrinal position 
(interestingly, if Warwick Fox had been American, he would, have failed the ‘audit’ at this level 
(Sessions 2006, 152)). Sessions then claims that   
“... this ongoing so-called “ecofeminism/deep ecology debate” by Plumwood, 
Warren, and other ecofeminists has amounted to little more than academic 
‘game playing’ and political power trips involving a ‘jockeying for position’ which 
has basically obfuscated the issues and delayed realistic solutions to the 
ecological crisis.” (Sessions 2006, 153)  
Such claims are unhelpful, to say the least. Not only does it derogate the character of thinkers 
with deep-running ecological concerns but it explicitly suggests feminist critiques of deep 
ecology are guilty of delaying “realistic solutions” – whatever they might be! – to the 
environmental crisis. It thereby dismisses an entire area of socio-theoretically informed work 
that has produced some of the most interesting, astute, and varied approaches to 
understanding the ecological crisis. Far from impeding realistic solutions eco-feminists have 
provided multiple understandings of what the problems and solutions might involve. They have 
also pointed out some glaring gaps in deep ecological theory (see for example Salleh 1999).13   
What Sessions is really complaining about is the apparent side-lining of deep ecological 
concerns over nature whenever social issues intrude. In other words, from his position, cultural 
relativism is not the only danger posed by taking social theory seriously; there is also the real 
risk of mixing its predominantly anthropocentric concerns with deep ecology’s ecological and 
                                                     
13 Interestingly, all five of Sessions’ key North American deep ecologists were male, as were the authors of all but 
two of the thirty-nine chapters in his edited collection Deep Ecology for the 21
st
 Century (1995) – no less than 
thirteen of the thirty nine articles in the book were by Naess himself.  
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ethical concerns in ways that detract from deep ecology’s mission. This “dilution” of ecological 
concerns proceeds on two fronts: politically/economically from the continual pressure to put 
environmental concerns in terms of human benefits/losses, and theoretically through the 
anthropocentric assumptions promoted by social theorists. So, far from seeing it as a (political) 
danger that deep ecology will be regarded as “ecology-only” movement, Sessions claims that, in 
a broad sense, this is precisely what Naess himself proposed (Sessions 2006, 122). Naess and 
Sessions, want at least one movement to stand for “an undiluted ecological position” (166) and 
stand out against co-option by, for example, by the environmental justice movement, which 
Sessions also targets.  
This, however, confuses two rather different issues. No one doubts the anthropocentric (and 
we might add, historically ethnocentric, androcentric, occidental etc.) biases of much social 
theory, although there is evidence that this is changing in several different and interesting fields 
(and ecofeminism is one of the reasons for this). It is certainly true that, from a radical 
ecological perspective, this anthropocentrism typifies and promulgates many ideas and 
practices that are implicated in producing, rather than solving, the ecological crisis. It also 
exemplifies the explicitly anthropocentric position taken by key proponents of the 
environmental justice movement which, as DeLuca (2007) rightly points out, is not so much an 
environmental justice movement as a human justice movement focused on addressing the roles 
that social inequalities play in people’s exposure to environmental harms. But social theory 
does not have to be used for solely anthropocentric purposes and, vitally necessary as the idea 
of environmental justice is (and it is vital and often missing from deep ecological positions), it 
does not obviate the pressing need for approaches that express concern for the more-than-just-
human world, positions that are not co-opted back into treating nature as simply a human 
resource. Just as some deep ecologists might broaden their social concerns, it is also important 
to influence those whose involvement may begin in environmental justice to deepen their 
ethical concerns, because the ecological crisis is certainly not just a crisis for humans.   
Social, cultural and political theories can have an important role here, although this obviously 
requires a quite radical re-thinking of the very idea of the social, the cultural, and the political 
(something that, by the way, social theorists have done on many occasions). But there is no 
fundamental reason why, here and now, this deeper re-thinking should not start from the felt 
reality of radical ecologist’s ethical and political concerns for non-human beings, just as 
previous attempts to provide alternative understandings of society in the past began from 
particular ethical and political concerns for specific human constituencies. What we need are 
creative ways of thinking about the entanglement of ecologies and societies, ways that do not 
involve seeing nature wholly, or even primarily, in terms of resource extraction and distribution. 
There are myriad possibilities here that can supplement and inform diverse deep ecological 
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approaches, but would no longer leave it possible to argue that deep ecology is necessarily 
reductive. Here again it is worth emphasizing that regarding societies and nature as entangled 
does not mean that they are entangled in the same ways or to the same degrees, nor does it 
preclude seeing that some forms of entanglement are more damaging to some constituents 
than others. It does mean that such assessments cannot be undertaken only on biotic grounds, 
that is to say, we need to be reflexive about the social, political, and cultural tropes informing 
such claims.   
There are, we might say, “symbiotic” possibilities in terms of a future co-evolution of deep 
ecological thought and ecologically oriented social theory. Deep ecologists could find these 
developments conducive so long as they explicitly recognize the importance of ethical relations 
to the more-than-just-human world. These approaches will, no doubt differ from many 
perspectives within deep ecology as it is currently constituted. For example, they not need to 
be philosophically “holistic,” they will almost certainly not focus on human population numbers 
per se, they may not necessarily proclaim the intrinsic value of all life or involve ideas of, say, 
transpersonal psychology but they would, nonetheless, challenge the principle of human 
sovereignty and offer very different ways of thinking about the communities of life on Earth.   
So I see this development of, what might be termed “ecologically oriented social theories / 
radical ecology” (let’s use the acronym EOSTRE)14 informed by the ethos of deep ecology is, as a 
crucial way of addressing the lacuna in deep ecology and yet carrying its spirit and politics 
forward. And even Naess, who was hardly enthusiastic about social theory, sometimes 
recognized this lacuna. For example, commenting on Salleh and Warren’s ecofeminist critiques 
of deep ecology, he remarks that it is “lamentable that among deep ecology theorists there are 
so few who are able to write extensively from within areas of social and political theory” (Naess 
1999, 271). It is indeed lamentable and something a radical ecosophy should be trying to 
address, especially if, as Sessions notes, Naess   
“genuinely believes in a diversity of world views (similar to the best of 
postmodernist thinking) ... and wants to attract as many diverse religious and 
philosophical positions as possible to provide support for the deep ecology 
movement.” (Sessions 2006, 166 my emphasis)15 
                                                     
14 Ēostre was is the name of a pagan goddess with associations with the dawn and spring (etymologically ‘aus’ 
means to shine) and her name survives in the word Easter. To use this acronym, perhaps risks confirming at least 
some of Ferry’s suspicions, but I think it unlikely that an acronym for a combination of social and ecological theory 
will take on the same quasi-religious interpretations as Lovelock’s view of earth as GAIA.     
15 It is heartening to find that Sessions is willing to criticize the doyen of sociobiology for his lack of awareness of 
socio-economic realities, as, for example when he states that Edward O. “Wilson tends to be politically naive in 
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AFTER ALL IS SAID AND DONE  
To return to issue one of The Trumpeter: A key question for social theory and deep ecology is 
how might “we approach understanding the relationships and inter-connections within and 
between living beings which give to each its special place and identity” (Drengson 1983, 2). This 
question might, alternatively, be expressed as “how we might understand, and what might 
constitute, ‘ecological community.’” That is to say, how might we understand ecological 
community in a way that is ethically, socially, politically, broader than, yet might still be 
informed by the “narrow” (2) scientific biotic understanding of ecological communities? How 
might we recognize and theorize the way that myriad senses of ecological community (material, 
phenomenological, hermeneutic, ethical) all relate to the ways in which we share this world –  
not in the sense of sharing it out or dividing it up like slicing a cake or sharing resources – but 
sharing our lives with others and being touched by the living magical co-creation and 
sustenance of this world.  
This question needs to be addressed through diverse theoretical approaches that can speak to, 
rather than ignore the ways that societies and natures are irretrievably intertwined. What I am 
suggesting here is a socio-theoretical expansion of the plurality of ecosophies that Naess always 
argued were advantageous, despite, or perhaps because, they are not easily transformed into a 
single ideology or theory of a transition (for some of my own suggestions, see Smith 2013). This 
means that we need to move away from a preoccupation with “the question of who is and who 
isn’t a deep ecologist” and especially the idea that this “can be settled by referring to the [eight 
point platform] platform [as] a “common ground for those who value all nature” (McLaughlin 
1995, 92). This is because we need to recognize that how “we approach understanding the 
relationships and inter-connections within and between living beings which give to each its 
special place and identity” and, as I have argued, its unique values, are matters that are 
inherently social too. Such matters cannot be addressed in ways that are purely biotic, 
especially if we want to argue for the ethical rather than just instrumental values generated in 
and through such relations.   
Perhaps, we might say that the common ground between deep ecologists and ecologically 
oriented social theorists is that of recognizing that there are ecological communities, and 
relations within and between more than just humans, that matter in more than just 
instrumental ways. But beyond this shared concern, the very notion of a “common ground” in a 
wider ecological sense is precisely where theoretical differences arise and where ecology 
happens. The key question for deep ecology and EOSTRE, I think, is what does being-in-
                                                                                                                                                                            
thinking that free market capitalism (and biotechnology) will provide realistic solutions to the ecological crisis” 
(Sessions 2006, 163).  
The Trumpeter 
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 30, Number 2 (2014)  
Mick Smith 154 
common-with-others involve? And furthermore any explication of this has to be provided in 
terms that inevitably have social, historical, and cultural and political aspects and 
consequences. This means both that no single explication will have universal assent even 
amongst deep ecologists but it also means that we can offer diverse understandings of 
ecological community that go far beyond the narrow confines of humanism. Perhaps the time is 
ripe for just such a development.  
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